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I. Introduction
Why do some firms adopt takeover defense measures and others do 
not? The question of what motivates the adoption of antitakeover provi- 
sions has attracted many researchers interested in corporate governance 
as well as policymakers. If firms are more likely to adopt antitakeover 
provisions when their performance deteriorates or when managers behave 
in their own interest, then antitakeover provisions can prevent a take- 
over that will discipline managers and increase firm values by removing 
them (e.g., Manne 1965). However, if firms tend to adopt antitakeover 
provisions when they are in danger of a takeover that breaches the trust 
among the stakeholders including managers and workers, then anti- 
takeover provisions can protect firms from a value-destroying takeover 
(e.g., Shleifer and Summers 1988). 
We examine whether managers adopt antitakeover provisions to aim 
for managerial entrenchment, that is, to prevent the loss of their own 
positions after takeovers. To this end, the Japanese experience serves 
as a quasi-natural experiment. In May 2005, the Japanese government 
released guidelines for antitakeover provisions, which endorse the 
Delaware takeover jurisprudence developed in the 1980s in the US. Since 
then, many firms have adopted poison pills, although no firms have 
previously adopted antitakeover provisions then. We consider the sudden 
emergence of antitakeover provisions in Japan a good opportunity to 
study the relationship between ex ante firm characteristics and the de- 
cision on whether to adopt antitakeover provisions. Without such an 
opportunity, it would be difficult to distinguish the causal relationship 
between whether firm performance affects the decision to adopt anti- 
takeover provisions and whether the adoption of antitakeover provisions 
affects firm performance. Distinguishing the causal relationship is one 
of the most important contributions we make to the literature of anti- 
takeover provisions. 
Studying Japanese firms has one additional advantage. In the US, 
managers are widely assumed to have the capability to adopt a poison 
pill at anytime without shareholder approval.1 Conversely, the Japanese 
guidelines previously mentioned strongly recommend that defensive meas- 
ures be adopted with shareholder approval at a general meeting of 
1 Latent poison pills seem to be valid according to a precedent set by a 
Delaware Supreme Court ruling in 1995 (Coates 2000; Danielson and Karpoff 
2006).
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shareholders.2 Following this guideline, most Japanese firms adopt de- 
fensive measures along with their shareholders’ approval at general 
meetings. This process enables a clear distinction between adopting and 
non-adopting firms, making our analysis of the motives for the adoption 
of antitakeover provisions meaningful. Notably, shareholders’ approval 
fails to prohibit completely the managerial entrenchment in Japan. Al- 
though the Pension Fund Association, which engages in the manage- 
ment of the assets of pension funds, often votes against the antitake- 
over provisions according to its guideline, other large shareholders, such 
as banks and firms belonging to the same business group and cross- 
held shares, favor the incumbent managers and vote for the antitake- 
over provisions. 
Using Japanese firm data from 2005 to 2008, we investigate the re- 
lationship between ex ante firm characteristics and the decision on 
adopting antitakeover provisions. Although some previous studies applied 
event study methodologies to US firms to investigate how the stock price 
responds to the announcement on the adoption of antitakeover provi- 
sions, event studies are difficult to apply to Japanese firms because 
Japanese firms often release multiple pieces of information simultane- 
ously together with the antitakeover provisions.
Whereas the operating or market performance measures are found to 
be insignificantly related to the likelihood of adopting antitakeover meas- 
ures, the proxies for managerial entrenchment, including the share of 
cross-shareholdings, are closely related to it. Our results suggest that 
although the shareholders’ approval is effective to some extent in pre- 
venting poorly performing firms from adopting antitakeover provisions, 
the shareholders’ approval is disabled by the cross-shareholdings. The 
positive effect of cross-shareholdings strongly suggests the managerial 
entrenchment motive to adopt antitakeover provisions.
A vast literature exists on the motives for and consequences of anti- 
takeover provisions. One strand of the literature, to which this article 
belongs, studies the ex ante characteristics of firms that adopt provi- 
sions (Strong and Meyer 1990; Davis 1991; Mallette and Fowler 1992; 
2 The guidelines postulate that, to prevent the board of directors from abusing 
its discretion, (1) there must be a mechanism whereby shareholders can express 
their own will regarding the takeover defense measures at the annual general 
meeting of shareholders, (2) defensive measures should include provisions which 
establish objective criteria for determining the conditions under which the de- 
fensive measures would be terminated by the board of directors, or (3) import- 
ance should be placed on the judgment of independent outsiders.
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Sundaramurthy 1996; Davis and Greve 1997; Danielson and Karpoff 
1998). Another strand of the literature investigates the ex post effect of 
adopting antitakeover provisions on market-based performance. Most of 
these studies used the short-term event study methodology and obtained 
mixed results (DeAngelo and Rice 1983; Linn and McConnell 1983; 
Jarrell and Poulsen 1987; Malatesta and Walkling 1988; Ryngaert 1988; 
Strong and Meyer 1990; Bhagat and Jefferis 1991; Brickley et al. 1994). 
Recently, Gompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2009) investigate 
the long-run market performance in terms of abnormal stock returns or 
Tobin’s Q, finding a negative relation between antitakeover indexes, 
which count the number of antitakeover provisions and ex post market 
performance. However, their findings do not necessarily imply that anti- 
takeover measures impair market performance. Lehn et al. (2007) suggest 
that firms with low market valuation are more likely to adopt antitake- 
over provisions and not vice versa. Straska and Waller (2010) document 
that Tobin’s Q actually increases in antitakeover provisions for firms 
with low bargaining power and high potential agency costs. Apart from 
market-based performance, some papers study operating performance. 
Danielson and Karpoff (2006), among others, examine the long-run op- 
erating performance and find that operating performance modestly im- 
proves during the five-year period after the poison pill adoption. 
The current article contributes to the literature examining the ex ante 
characteristics of firms that adopt antitakeover provisions. The unique 
Japanese regulatory environment alleviates the endogeneity issue that 
has potentially plagued previous studies as mentioned previously. Con- 
sidering that the majority of earlier studies focused on US firms, this 
article also adds useful information on the motives for adopting antitake- 
over provisions among firms in a country where corporate laws and 
governance are different from those in the US.3 However, we fail to 
obtain sufficiently long-run data to investigate the ex post long-run per- 
formance because only several years have passed since Japanese firms 
have begun to adopt antitakeover provisions.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we 
briefly describe an overview of hostile takeovers and antitakeover provi- 
sions in Japan. In Section 3, we present some hypotheses on the mo- 
tives for adopting antitakeover provisions based on previous studies. In 
3 Evidence outside the US is scarce. Rose (2005) examines the influence of 
takeover defenses on long-term investments, excess liquidity, and capital struc- 
ture using Danish firm data.
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Section 4, we describe our dataset and estimation methodology. In Sec- 
tion 5, we present our baseline results. In Section 6, we discuss robust- 
ness. Section 7 concludes with some policy implications.
II. Overview of Hostile Takeovers and Antitakeover 
Provisions in Japan
In Japan, hostile takeovers were almost nonexistent until the early 
2000s. Without markets for corporate control, main banks played a lead- 
ing role in Japanese corporate governance from the 1960s to the 1980s 
(Tsuru 2000). Although there were some hostile bids by domestic and 
foreign investors towards the end of the 1980s (“the bubble period”), 
they were unsuccessful. Traditionally, cross-shareholdings within a busi- 
ness group prevent hostile takeovers. As cross-shareholdings were grad- 
ually dissolved in the 1990s when stock prices stagnated and mark-to- 
market accounting was partially introduced, hostile takeover bids grad- 
ually increased. However, hostile raiders were still foreign-affiliated funds 
at the beginning of the 2000s. Hostile takeovers were often regarded as 
creating a poor reputation or even as socially unacceptable. Since then, 
some domestic firms have begun to attempt hostile takeover bids against 
other domestic firms. Faced with the increasing threat of hostile take- 
overs by domestic firms, Japanese firms have sought defensive measures. 
Milhaupt (2005) describes the changing situation in the early 2000s in 
Japan as follows:4
No conventional wisdom seemed more accurate and enduring than 
the disdain for U.S.-style hostile takeovers in Japan-the land of 
stable, friendly shareholders, expansive views of corporate purpose 
that go well beyond shareholder wealth maximization, and abiding 
social concern for the preservation of harmonious relationships. But 
things change, and predictions are risky. For the past year, Japan 
has been riveted by a series of contests for corporate control, fea- 
turing sharp-elbowed tactical maneuvering, strategic litigation, and 
creative use of corporate law to craft defensive measures (p. 2172).
In May 2005, the Japanese government released the guidelines for 
antitakeover provisions, which endorse the Delaware takeover jurispru- 
4 Schaede (2006) also describes the sudden emergence of the market for cor- 
porate control in the early 2000s in Japan.
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Sources: Commercial Law Center Inc. and Recof.
Note: The percentages of firms that adopted antitakeover provisions among 
all listed firms are shown in parentheses.
TABLE 1 
NUMBER OF FIRMS THAT ADOPTED ANTITAKEOVER PROVISIONS
dence developed in the 1980s in the US.5 Since then, many firms have 
adopted antitakeover provisions consisting of poison pills. Table 1 shows 
that firms adopting antitakeover provisions numbered zero in FY2004, 
47 in FY2005, and 132 in FY2008.6 By the end of 2008, one-seventh of 
the firms listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange had adopted antitakeover 
provisions. Among the various types of antitakeover provisions, the prior 
warning type is extremely popular. In this type of provision, an existing 
rule must be followed by bidders pursuing takeovers, and the breach of 
the rule leads to the implementation of defensive measures, such as the 
issuance of new stock reservation rights.
III. Hypotheses
What are the motives for adopting antitakeover provisions? This article 
examines whether managers adopt them to aim for managerial entrench- 
ment, that is, to protect themselves from the threat of losing their posi- 
tions through takeovers. We classify the motives for entrenchment into 
two categories: the various measures of firm performance likely to depend 
on managers’ efforts or quality and the firm characteristics that facili- 
5 The guidelines are entitled, “Guidelines for Takeover Defense Measures for 
the Joint Interests of Firm Value and Shareholders.” The guidelines stress three 
principles of takeover defense measures: (i) protection and enhancement of cor- 
porate value and the interests of shareholders as a whole, (ii) placement of 
emphasis on prior disclosure and shareholders’ will, and (iii) assurance of the 
necessity and reasonableness of defense measures and prevention of excessive 
defense measures.
6 The fiscal year begins on April 1 and ends on the final day of the following 
March.
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tate managerial entrenchment. In addition to these two entrenchment 
motives, we consider the probability of being a target of a takeover 
beyond the managers’ control, at least in the short run.
A. Poor Performance
Hostile takeovers can function as a disciplinary device for management 
by replacing managers of poorly performing firms, thereby improving 
efficiency and shareholder values. Poorly performing firms are likely to 
be targeted for takeover because the acquirers can improve firm per- 
formance to a significant extent by replacing the managers (Manne 1965). 
The worse the performance of a firm in terms of operating performance 
or stock market valuation, the more likely that managers adopt anti- 
takeover provisions to aim for entrenchment. Furthermore, firms with 
abundant liquid assets may adopt such provisions because they are not 
required to return such assets to the stockholders even if they cannot 
find growth opportunities. Hence, firms with abundant liquid assets tend 
to spend them on inefficient projects for the sake of the managers’ pri- 
vate benefit (Jensen 1986). Such firms are likely to be targets of hostile 
takeovers and consequently adopt antitakeover provisions. 
We summarize the relationship between firm performance and the 
adoption of antitakeover provisions in the following three hypotheses, 
along with some relevant empirical evidence.
Hypothesis 1-1: Poor operating performance
If a firm’s operating performance is relatively poor, the firm is more 
likely to adopt antitakeover provisions.
Malatesta and Walkling (1988) show that, during the mid-1980s in the 
US, firms that adopted poison pills had seen significantly lower profi- 
tability in a previous year than firms that failed to adopt poison pills. 
Conversely, Mallette and Fowler (1992) find no significant relationship 
between the return on equity and the adoption of poison pills in 1988 
in the US.
Hypothesis 1-2: Poor stock market performance
If stock market valuation is relatively low, the firm is more likely to 
adopt antitakeover provisions.
Strong and Meyer (1990) examine US firms and find that firms that 
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adopted poison pills had lower price-to-earnings ratios. Davis and Stout 
(1992) also find that firms with lower market-to-book ratios are more 
likely to be a target of a takeover. Conversely, Davis (1991), Sundaramurthy 
(1996), and Davis and Greve (1997) find that the market-to-book ratio 
is insignificantly related to the adoption of poison pills.
Hypothesis 1-3: Liquidity
Firms with more liquid assets are more likely to adopt antitakeover 
provisions.
Using a sample of Japanese firms, Xu (2007) finds that firms with 
high liquid asset ratios and low Tobin’s Q are likely to be targets of 
hostile takeovers by some activist funds.
B. Entrenchment
Several firm characteristics can be proxies for how solidly managers 
entrench themselves from outside shareholders: firm age, CEO’s tenure, 
board composition, managerial stock ownership, and cross-shareholding, 
among others.
a) Firm Age
Old firms tend to have inflexible organization and face difficulty in 
adapting to the changes in the environment. Furthermore, they tend to 
oppose a drastic change of management and adopt antitakeover provi- 
sions to protect the status quo.
Hypothesis 2-1: Firm age
Old firms are more likely to adopt antitakeover provisions.
Davis and Stout (1992) show that, in the US, older firms are more 
likely to be a target of takeovers.
b) CEO’s Tenure
When a CEO holds his/her position for an extended period of time, 
he/she can exert a stronger influence on the board, including the ap- 
pointment of directors, and thus can entrench himself/herself from 
outsiders. He/she is likely to adopt poison pills to strengthen further 
his/her grip on his/her firm.
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Hypothesis 2-2: CEO’s tenure
Firms at which the CEO has a long tenure are more likely to adopt 
antitakeover provisions.
Malette and Fowler (1992) study the companies included in Standard 
and Poor’s 500 Index and find a positive, although statistically insignifi- 
cant, correlation between the CEOs’ tenure and the likelihood of the 
adoption of poison pills.
c) Board Composition
Outside directors are more likely to be objective and independent of 
management than insiders (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983). Out- 
side directors are expected to monitor managers for the sake of their 
shareholders. Hence, firms with a board composed of a high proportion 
of insiders tend to adopt antitakeover provisions because such board is 
likely to agree with the current managers (Davis 1991; Mallette and 
Fowler 1992; Sundaramurthy 1996; Danielson and Karpoff 1998).
Hypothesis 2-3: Board composition
Firms with a board composed of a high proportion of insiders and a 
smaller proportion of independent outsiders are more likely to adopt 
antitakeover provisions.
Empirical evidence from US firms is mixed. Mallette and Fowler (1992) 
and Sundaramurthy (1996) find that the correlation between the share 
of outside directors and the likelihood of adopting poison pills is posi- 
tive, although insignificant, for US firms. Conversely, Danielson and 
Karpoff (1998) find that the lower the proportion of inside directors, the 
more likely the firm is to adopt poison pills; they find this relationship 
to be significant. Davis (1991) and Davis and Greve (1997) find results 
similar to those of Danielson and Karpoff (1998), although the results 
are insignificant.
d) Managerial Stock Ownership and Cross-Shareholdings
Ownership has a great effect on the extent to which managers’ inter- 
ests are aligned with those of their stockholders. A larger share of man- 
agerial stock ownership suggests a greater degree of alignment between 
the two. A lower share of managerial ownership may result in conflicts 
of interests and managerial entrenchment and hence the adoption of anti- 
takeover provisions (Malatesta and Walkling 1988; Davis 1991; Mallete 
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and Fowler 1992). In contrast, a larger share of managerial ownership 
can empower managers and result in entrenchment (Fama and Jensen 
1983; Demsetz and Lehn 1985). These two opposing arguments con- 
cerning managerial ownership may be settled by examining the non- 
linear effects on the degree of firm value. Morck et al. (1988) find an 
inverse U-curve relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
value.
In addition to managerial ownership, cross-shareholdings in a busi- 
ness group have been used as a takeover defense measure in Japan 
since capital accounts were liberalized in 1964. A high share of cross- 
shareholdings suggests that managerial entrenchment is solid and can 
indicate a high likelihood of adopting antitakeover provisions. 
Hypothesis 2-4: Managerial ownership as the alignment of manager/ 
shareholder interests
Firms with a lower share of managerial ownership are more likely to 
adopt antitakeover provisions.
Hypothesis 2-5: Managerial ownership as entrenchment
Firms with a higher share of managerial ownership are more likely to 
adopt antitakeover provisions.
Hypothesis 2-6: Cross-shareholding
Firms with a higher share of cross-shareholding are more likely to 
adopt antitakeover provisions.
Many empirical studies on US firms find that a low share of man- 
agerial ownership results in a high likelihood of adopting poison pills 
(Malatesta and Walkling 1988; Strong and Meyer 1990; Davis 1991; 
Mallete and Fowler 1992; Davis and Greve 1997; Danielson and Karpoff 
1998). In contrast, Sundaramurthy (1996) finds a U-curve relationship 
between the share of managerial ownership and the likelihood of adopt- 
ing poison pills.
C. Other Factors Affecting the Probability of Being a Target of a 
Hostile Takeover 
Other factors affect the probability that a firm may become a target of 
a hostile takeover. Considering that these factors are beyond the man- 
agers’ control at least in the short term, they increase the likelihood of 
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adopting antitakeover provisions either for managerial entrenchment or 
for the prevention of a breach of trust. The factors we consider are firm 
size, stock liquidity and ownership, leverage, and adoption of antitake- 
over provisions by rivals, among others.
a) Firm Size
Acquirers, when financially constrained, can acquire a firm more easily 
when the target firm is small in terms of market value (Comment and 
Schwert 1995; Davis and Greve 1997). To protect themselves, small firms 
tend to adopt antitakeover provisions.
Hypothesis 3-1: Firm size
Firms with a smaller market value are more likely to adopt antitake- 
over provisions.
Davis (1991) and Davis and Greve (1997) find that, among US firms, 
firms with smaller market values are more likely to adopt poison pills. 
Conversely, Comment and Schwert (1995) find that firms with a larger 
asset size tend to adopt poison pills in the US.
b) Stock Liquidity and Ownership
If stocks are held more by foreigners, individuals, or other dispersed 
investors and less by stable stockholders, including business partners 
and financial institutions, stocks become more liquid; hence, hostile 
takeovers are more likely to be successful (Danielson and Karpoff 1998). 
Xu (2007) finds that in Japan, when the share of dominant stable share- 
holders is low, firms are more likely to be targets of hostile takeovers.
The share of institutional stockholders potentially exerts two competing 
effects. If institutional investors, including foreign investors, have a short 
horizon and easily sell their shares in response to tender offers, firms 
whose shares are held by institutional investors are likely to adopt 
antitakeover provisions (Davis and Stout 1992; Mallette and Fowler 
1992). However, if institutional investors behave themselves in the inter- 
est of general stockholders, a large share of institutional investors may 
find difficulty in adopting antitakeover provisions (Sundaramurthy 1996).
Hypothesis 3-2:
(i) Dominant shareholders
   A low share of ownership by dominant shareholders and a high 
share of small shareholders result in a high likelihood of adopting 
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antitakeover provisions.
(ii) Institutional shareholders (with short time horizons)
   A high share of ownership by institutional shareholders results in 
a high likelihood of adopting antitakeover provisions.
(iii) Institutional shareholders (as a monitor)
   A high share of institutional shareholders results in a low likeli- 
hood of adopting takeover provisions.
Davis (1991) and Davis and Greve (1997) find that in the US, a low 
concentration of ownership results in a high likelihood of adopting poi- 
son pills. As for the effects of institutional investors, many researchers 
find a positive correlation between the share of institutional sharehold- 
ers and the likelihood of adopting poison pills for US firms (Strong and 
Meyer 1990; Davis 1991; Mallette and Fowler 1992; Davis and Greve 
1997; Danielson and Karpoff 1998), although Sundaramurthy (1996) 
finds no significant correlation between them.
c) Leverage
Hostile takeovers are often conducted to redistribute free cash flow to 
stockholders by raising the leverage (Jensen 1989). Low-levered firms 
are more likely to be targets; hence, they adopt antitakeover provisions.
Hypothesis 3-3: Firms with lower debt-to-asset ratios are more likely to 
adopt antitakeover provisions.
Davis and Stout (1992) find that in the US, firms with low debt-to- 
asset ratios are more likely to be targets. Xu (2007) finds a similar 
tendency of Japanese firms.
d) Adoption of Antitakeover Provisions by Rival Firms
As more firms in the same industry adopt antitakeover provisions, 
firms without antitakeover provisions are more likely to become targets 
(Davis 1991). The adoption of antitakeover provisions may not result in 
a deterioration of the stock market if many firms have already adopted 
them, mitigating a CEO’s hesitation about it.
Hypothesis 3-4: The adoption of antitakeover provisions by a high pro- 
portion of firms in a given industry results in a higher likelihood of 
adopting antitakeover provisions by other firms in the industry.
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Davis (1991) finds no significant correlation for US firms between the 
proportion of firms in a given industry that adopted antitakeover pro- 
visions and the likelihood of each firm in adopting them.
IV. Data and Methodology
Our data source for financial statements and measures of corporate 
governance is the NEEDS-Corporate Governance Evaluation System, 
abbreviated as NEEDS-CGES, published by the Nikkei Digital Media. 
NEEDS-CGES is a dataset containing various measures of corporate 
governance, including ownership structure and board members.
Sample firms are firms listed on stock exchanges in Japan,7 except 
for firms determined to be delisted, real estate investment trusts, exchange- 
traded funds, preferred stocks, the Bank of Japan, firms listed in the 
foreign country section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and venture funds 
listed on the Osaka Stock Exchange. The numbers of sample firms are 
3761, 3809, 3937, and 3883 in March 2005, March 2006, March 2007, 
and March 2008, respectively. 
We use the financial statements of the accounting year prior to the 
decision to adopt antitakeover provisions. Most Japanese firms use an 
accounting year that begins in April and ends in March. Therefore, 
when we examine a decision to adopt antitakeover provisions that occur 
between April 2005 and March 2006, we use the financial statements 
for the year ending in March 2005. If firms adopt a different accounting 
year, we use the financial statements for the year prior to the decision 
to adopt antitakeover provisions. 
Our data sources for the adoption of antitakeover provisions are a 
member service provided by the Commercial Law Center Inc. (CLC or 
Shoji Homu Kenkyu Kai in Japanese) and the firms’ press releases. Data 
from CLC include the names of firms adopting antitakeover provisions, 
the dates of their adoptions, and the contents of the provisions. Another 
possible data source for antitakeover provisions is the Monthly MARR 
published by RECOF. We have confirmed that our sample is more com- 
prehensive than the Monthly MARR in that all of the firms contained in 
the Monthly MARR, which adopted antitakeover provisions, are included 
among our sample firms.
We estimate the likelihood of adopting antitakeover provisions using 
7 The Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Sapporo, and Fukuoka exchanges and JASDAQ, 
Tokyo Mothers, and Osaka Hercules exchanges.
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the following probit model for each accounting year, in which the de- 
pendent variable, Poison, takes the value of unity if the firm adopted 
antitakeover provisions and zero otherwise.
* ' ' '
, , ,.i i A A i B B i C C iPoison Const x x x eβ β β= + + + +             (1) 











The dependent variable, Poison
*, is a latent variable affecting the deci- 
sion of firms i on the adoption of antitakeover provisions. Three vectors 
of explanatory variables, A, B, and C, represent relevant measures of 
the hypotheses described in the previous section. Const. is a constant, 
and βs are coefficient vectors on each vector of explanatory variables. e 
is a random error. We briefly describe the explanatory variables. The 
Appendix contains the details of the variables. 
The first set of explanatory variables represents the measures of firm 
performance: returns on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q, price-to-book ratio 
(PBR), and liquid asset ratio. Hypotheses 1-1 to 1-3 suggest that ROA, 
Tobin’s Q, and PBR take negative coefficients and that the liquid asset 
ratio takes a positive coefficient.
The second set of explanatory variables represents measures of man- 
agerial entrenchment: firm age, CEO’s tenure, proportion of outside dir- 
ectors, share of managerial ownership, and share of cross-holdings. Hy- 
potheses 2-1 to 2-6 suggest that the firm age, CEO’s tenure, and share 
of cross-holdings take positive coefficients, whereas the share of outside 
directors takes negative coefficients. The share of managerial ownership 
takes either a positive or negative coefficient.
The third set of explanatory variables consists of control variables 
affecting the likelihood of becoming a target of hostile takeovers: the 
logarithm of market-valued equity, the share of ownership by dominant 
shareholders, the share of ownership by institutional investors, the share 
of minority shareholders, the debt-to-asset ratio, and the proportion of 
firms that adopted antitakeover provisions in the industry of the firm. 
Hypotheses 3-1 to 3-4 suggest that the logarithm of market-valued equity, 
the share of dominant shareholders, and the debt-to-asset ratio take 
negative coefficients, whereas the share of institutional investors, the 
share of minority shareholders, and the proportion of the firms that 
adopted antitakeover provisions in the industry take positive coefficients.
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ROA 47 3698 0.064 0.066 -0.003  
Tobin's Q 47 3639 1.476 1.490 -0.014  
PBR 47 3626 1.937 2.243 -0.305  
Liquid asset ratio 47 3558 0.299 0.242 0.057  **
Firm age 47 3714 52.468 45.609 6.860 *
CEO's tenure 47 3714 3.936 6.987 -3.051  **
Proportion of outside 
directors
47 3714 0.094 0.070 0.025  
Share of managerial 
ownership
47 3626 0.046 0.094 -0.047  **
Share of cross-holdings 47 3618 0.092 0.074 0.018  
Logarithm of 
market-value equity
47 3601 10.895 9.798 1.097  ***
Share of dominant 
shareholders
47 3714 0.044 0.146 -0.103  ***
Share of institutional 
investors
47 3594 0.241 0.133 0.108  ***
Share of minority 
shareholders
46 3655 0.225 0.227 -0.002  
Debt-to-asset ratio 47 3706 0.498 0.547 -0.049  　













Proportion of outside directors
Share of managerial ownership
Share of cross-holdings
Logarithm of market-value equity
Share of dominant shareholders
Share of institutional investors





























































SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS302



















ROA 149 3643 0.073 0.070 0.002
Tobin's Q 149 3581 1.468 1.741 -0.273
PBR 149 3576 2.020 2.675 -0.656
Liquid asset ratio 148 3496 0.265 0.258 0.007
Firm age 149 3636 61.101 46.086 15.015 ***
CEO's tenure 149 3660 5.060 7.035 -1.975 ***
Proportion of outside 
directors
149 3660 0.091 0.081 0.010
Share of managerial 
ownership
149 3555 0.026 0.097 -0.071 ***
Share of cross-holdings 147 3544 0.108 0.063 0.045 ***
Logarithm of 
market-value equity
147 3428 4.587 4.513 0.074
Share of dominant 
shareholders
149 3660 0.030 0.151 -0.120 ***
Share of institutional 
investors
149 3554 0.276 0.147 0.129 ***
Share of minority 
shareholders
149 3593 0.209 0.213 -0.004
Debt-to-asset ratio 149 3654 0.477 0.536 -0.059
Proportion of the firms 
that adopted antitakeover 
provisions in the industry




Table 2 summarizes the descriptive sample statistics of the above 
variables. Table 2 also reports the test statistics on whether the means 
and medians are different for firms that adopted antitakeover provisions 
and those that did not.8
8 For the equality of medians, we conducted a non-parametric two-sample 
test. This test checks the null hypothesis that the two samples are drawn from 
populations with the same median. The chi-squared test statistic is computed. 
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Several features are evident from Table 2. First, the differences in 
performance measures are unclear. For example, although the means of 
Tobin’s Q are lower for firms adopting antitakeover provisions than those 
not adopting them in some years, the medians of ROA and Tobin’s Q 
are higher for firms adopting such provisions. Second, firm age and the 
share of cross-shareholdings are significantly higher, and the share of 
outside directors and the share of managerial ownership are significantly 
lower for firms adopting antitakeover provisions than those not adopting 
them in terms of both means and medians, consistent with Hypotheses 
2-1, 2-6, 2-3, and 2-4, respectively. Third, among the control variables, 
the share of ownership by dominant shareholders and the debt-to-asset 
ratio are significantly lower, and the share of ownership by institutional 
investors is significantly higher for firms adopting antitakeover provisions 
than for firms not adopting them, consistent with Hypotheses 3-2(i), 3-3 
and 3-2(ii), respectively, although the significance levels of the debt-to- 
asset ratio vary depending on the year. Moreover, the proportion of firms 
For the equality of means, we conducted a t-test.
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ROA 234 3409 0.074 0.070 0.004  
Tobin's Q 232 3349 1.479 1.759 -0.280  **
PBR 232 3344 2.098 2.716 -0.618  **
Liquid asset ratio 231 3274 0.260 0.259 0.001  
Firm age 234 3426 58.274 46.317 11.957  ***
CEO's tenure 234 3426 7.650 8.062 -0.412  
Proportion of outside 
directors
234 3426 0.072 0.082 -0.010  
Share of managerial 
ownership
230 3328 0.045 0.102 -0.057  ***
Share of cross-holdings 232 3312 0.100 0.060 0.040  ***
Logarithm of market-value 
equity
232 3351 10.905 10.072 0.833  ***
Share of dominant 
shareholders
234 3426 0.036 0.158 -0.122  ***
Share of institutional 
investors
230 3324 0.230 0.141 0.089  ***
Share of minority 
shareholders
232 3361 0.209 0.213 -0.004  
Debt-to-asset ratio 234 3420 0.510 0.537 -0.027  **
Proportion of the firms that 
adopted antitakeover 
provisions in the industry




adopting antitakeover provisions in the industry is higher for firms 
adopting antitakeover provisions, consistent with Hypothesis 3-4. 
V. Baseline Results
Table 3 shows the baseline year-by-year estimation results. The first 
and second rows show the coefficient and marginal effects on the mean 
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value of each explanatory variable. Given that ROA, Tobin’s Q, and PBR 
are highly correlated with one another, we include these variables one 
by one. 
A. Performance 
Among the performance measures, none of the ROA, Tobin’s Q, or PBR 
is significant for any year, failing to support Hypothesis 1-1 or 1-2.9 
Considering the results for year 2005, the liquid asset ratio is signifi- 
cantly positive, consistent with Hypothesis 1-3. However, the significance 
of the liquid asset ratio disappears in year 2006 and thereafter. 
9 As a robustness check, we used the deviations from the industry-median of 
the performance measures to control for the effects of industrial shocks to firm 
performance and found no significant coefficients on the performance measures. 
The results are available from the authors upon request.
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of means  
(A－B)
ROA 129 3355 0.067 0.065 0.002  
Tobin's Q 130 3299 1.178 1.377 -0.199  **
PBR 130 3289 1.425 2.375 -0.950  
Liquid asset ratio 131 3208 0.238 0.251 -0.013  
Firm age 131 3374 61.221 45.324 15.897  ***
CEO's tenure 131 3374 7.290 7.981 -0.691  
Proportion of outside 
directors
131 3374 0.060 0.090 -0.031  ***
Share of managerial 
ownership
130 3291 0.051 0.107 -0.056  ***
Share of cross-holdings 128 3282 0.120 0.060 0.060 ***
Logarithm of 
market-value equity
130 3310 10.642 9.763 0.879  ***
Share of dominant 
shareholders
131 3373 0.028 0.164 -0.136  ***
Share of institutional 
investors
130 3283 0.206 0.136 0.069  ***
Share of minority 
shareholders
131 3327 0.212 0.211 0.002  
Debt-to-asset ratio 131 3352 0.530 0.537 -0.007  









Table 3 suggests that firms with a high degree of managerial entrench- 
ment tend to adopt antitakeover provisions. 
First, firm age takes positive and marginally significant coefficients in 
one specification (with ROA as a performance measure) for years 2006 
and 2008, consistent with Hypothesis 2-1. 
Second, the share of managerial ownership takes negative and sig- 
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Notes: We conduct two-sample t-tests with equal variances for the mean 
tests and non-parametric two-sample tests for the median tests.  
*, **, and *** statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
TABLE 2 
(CONTINUED)
nificant coefficients for years 2006 and 2007, and a marginally signifi- 
cant coefficient for year 2008, suggesting that managerial ownership 
serves the alignment of interests between stockholders and managers 
(Hypothesis 2-4). 
Third, the share of cross-shareholdings takes positive and significant 
coefficients for years 2006, 2007, and 2008. Although firms with a high 
share of cross-shareholdings are unlikely to be targets of hostile take- 
overs (Xu 2007), they tend to adopt antitakeover provisions. This result 
strongly suggests a strong motive for managerial entrenchment (Hy- 
pothesis 2-6).
However, the CEO’s tenure and the share of outside directors do not 
take significant coefficients. The guidelines strongly suggest that the 
judgment of outside directors should be valued when deciding on the 
adoption of antitakeover provisions as a means of ensuring their neces- 
sity and validity. The guidelines may have an effect, such that firms with 
a higher share of outside directors may be more likely to adopt anti- 
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takeover provisions. One may suspect that firms may have increased the 
number of their outside directors to enable them to adopt antitakeover 
provisions in accordance with the guidelines after they were released. If 
this is the case, then the estimated coefficient is biased upwards. To 
deal with this possible endogeneity, the shares of outside directors as of 
2004 are later used as an instrumental variable before the guidelines 
were released to estimate the likelihood of adopting antitakeover provi- 
sions in year 2006 and thereafter.
C. Control Variables
First, the logarithm of market value takes positive and significant co- 
efficients, contradicting Hypothesis 3-1. A small firm may find it diffi- 
cult or costly to adopt antitakeover provisions. Comment and Schwert 
(1995) also find a positive correlation between firm size and the likeli- 
hood of adopting poison pills for US firms, insisting that adopting poi- 
son pills requires a fixed cost including attorneys’ fees, hence exhibiting 
a scale economy.
Second, the share of ownership by dominant shareholders takes nega- 
tive and significant coefficients for all years, consistent with Hypothesis 
3-2(i). The share of ownership by institutional shareholders takes posi- 
tive and significant coefficients for year 2006, suggesting that institu- 
tional investors have short-time horizons [Hypothesis 3-2(ii)] rather than 
work as effective monitors, although this result holds only for one year.
Third, the debt-to-asset ratio takes negative and significant coefficients 
for year 2006, consistent with Hypothesis 3-3. 
Finally, the proportion of firms adopting antitakeover provisions in 
the industry of the firm takes positive and significant coefficients for 
years 2007 and 2008, consistent with Hypothesis 3-4.
D. Discussion
A key finding of the baseline estimation results is that, whereas the 
operating or market performance measures are insignificantly related to 
the likelihood of adopting the antitakeover measures, the proxies for the 
managerial entrenchment are closely related to it.
One reason for the irrelevance of firm performance may be that firms 
with poor performance cannot adopt antitakeover provisions because 
shareholders will disagree to them based on the judgment that such 
provisions will deprive them of their opportunity to replace the current 
poor managers with more able ones. For example, the internal guideline 
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set by the Pension Fund Association, which engages in the asset man- 
agement of pension funds, postulates that it votes for the antitakeover 
provisions only if the managers clearly explain that the provisions will 
be effective in enhancing the long-term shareholder values. The poor 
performance may be regarded as violating their standards. Furthermore, 
the fixed cost of adopting antitakeover provisions may also discourage 
poorly performing firms to adopt them. The positive effect of firm size 
on the likelihood of adopting them suggests a significant fixed cost. 
The positive effect of the share of cross-shareholdings on the likelihood 
of antitakeover provisions suggests that the shareholders’ approval at 
the general meeting is not so effective to prevent managerial entrench- 
ment motive, especially when banks and firms in the business group 
mutually own the shares. Firms with a higher share of cross- 
shareholdings, being less likely to be targets of hostile takeover and yet 
are more likely to adopt antitakeover provisions, suggest a strong motive 
for managerial entrenchment by those firms.
The negative effect of managerial ownership and the positive effect of 
firm age on the likelihood of adopting antitakeover provisions are also 
suggestive of the managerial entrenchment motive. High managerial 
ownership serves as the alignment of interests between managers and 
shareholders, whereas old firms may tend to have inflexible organiza- 
tions and be inclined to protect the status quo.
We interpret the positive effect of the share of institutional investors 
on the adoption of antitakeover provisions observed in 2006 to suggest 
that firms with liquid stocks are more likely to be a takeover target and 
hence are more likely to adopt antitakeover provisions. However, pension 
funds, among others, may behave in the interest of shareholders and 
tend to vote against antitakeover provisions according to their guidelines. 
Thus, institutional investors include not only pension funds that invest 
in stocks through trust accounts of banks but also life insurance com- 
panies that often form a business group and cross-hold shares. Our 
weak result of the share of institutional investors may reflect such 
variety of institutional investors. 
We do not interpret our results to suggest the conflict of interest be- 
tween large shareholders and minority shareholders. The share of owner- 
ship by the dominant shareholders is actually found to have a negative 
effect on the adoption of antitakeover provisions. Furthermore, managers 
of Japanese firms affiliated with a business group are not majority 
shareholders themselves.10 Unlike those in other East Asian countries, 
corporations in Japan are widely held, and state-controlled or family- 
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controlled firms are rare (Claessens et al. 2000). 
Both the share of cross-shareholdings and the share of dominant 
shareholders are related to the ownership of the majority shareholder 
and thus should have little reason for showing opposite signs to each 
other. However, most of the dominant shareholders are the parent com- 
panies of their affiliated companies; thus, they tend to maximize their 
joint profits. Conversely, cross-shareholdings form a weekly-tied business 
group and hence do not tend to demand aggressively value maximization 
of each other but rather tend to protect the incumbent managers of 
each other. These differences may result in the opposite effects on the 
adoption of antitakeover provisions.
   
VI. Robustness
In this section, we verify the robustness of the baseline results by 
changing the specifications. To save space, we show the results only for 
ROA as a performance measure. Nevertheless, most of the results do 
not change when we use Tobin’s Q or PBR.11
A. Non-linear Effects of Ownership Structures on the Adoption of 
Antitakeover Provisions
Managerial ownership may have non-linear effects on the adoption of 
antitakeover provisions, given its two opposing effects: aligning man- 
agerial motives with shareholders’ interests versus empowering manager- 
ial entrenchment. Morck et al. (1988) find an inverse U-curve relation- 
ship between managerial ownership and the firm value. To consider 
such non-linear relationships, we add the squared value of the share of 
managerial ownership to the explanatory variables. Column 1 in Table 
4 shows the estimation results. In year 2006, only the level of manager- 
ial ownership share is significant and negative, whereas in year 2008, 
only the squared value of managerial ownership is significant and nega- 
tive. In both cases, managerial ownership share has a negative effect on 
the adoption of antitakeover provisions. In year 2007, the level and 
squared values of the managerial ownership share are both significant 
10 Claessen et al. (2000) show that the proportion of firms in which managers 
are from the controlling family is only 37.2 percent in Japan, the lowest among 
the nine East Asian countries, including Korea (80.7 percent).
11 The results for Tobin’s Q and PBR are available from the authors upon 
request.
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with negative and positive signs, respectively, suggesting a U-shaped 
effect of managerial ownership. However, in most of the relevant regions, 
managerial ownership has a negative effect on the adoption of antitake- 
over provisions. [The proportion of firms with the share of managerial 
ownership exceeding the bottom level (45 percent) is only 3 percent in 
our sample.] Managerial ownership serves to alleviate the conflict of 
interests between managers and shareholders in most cases.
The effect of managerial ownership on the adoption of antitakeover pro- 
visions may also depend on whether the share of cross-shareholdings is 
high. We construct the dummy that takes one if the share of cross- 
shareholding exceeds its median (4 percent) and add the intersection of 
this dummy and the share of managerial ownership to the explanatory 
variables. Column 2 of Table 4 shows the estimation result. In year 
2007, the interaction term is negative and significant, while the coeffi- 
cient on the share of managerial ownership is still negative and signifi- 
cant. This finding suggests that the interest-alignment effect of man- 
agerial ownership is stronger (or the entrenchment effect is less serious) 
if the share of cross-shareholding is high. However, the coefficient on 
the share of cross-shareholding itself is notably still positive and sig- 
nificant. A disciplining effect of cross-shareholding, if any, exists only in 
2007 on the condition that managerial ownership is sufficiently high. In 
other years, such a significant interaction is unobserved, and the en- 
trenchment effect of cross-shareholding dominates.
Ownership of the dominant shareholder may also have an ambivalent 
relation to the adoption of antitakeover provisions. For example, the dom- 
inant shareholder with ownership above 50% may not care whether the 
provisions are adopted, whereas the dominant shareholder with owner- 
ship below 50% may oppose these provisions. We add the squared value 
of the share of dominant shareholders to the explanatory variables. 
Column 3 of Table 4 shows the estimation results. In years 2007 and 
2008, the squared values are negative and significant, whereas the level 
values are insignificant, suggesting that the share of dominant share- 
holders monotonically decreases the likelihood of the adoption of anti- 
takeover provisions.
B. Endogeneity of the Share of Outside Directors
After the guidelines were published in 2005, the firms that wanted 
to adopt antitakeover provisions might have increased their share of 
outside directors to comply with the guidelines before they actually 
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ENDOGENEITY OF THE SHARE OF OUTSIDE DIRECTORS: 
PROBIT MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS REGRESSORS
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Wald test of exogeneity (/athrho＝0): chi2(1)＝1.78 Prob > chi2＝0.1827
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. The Wald test of exogeneity shows that the error terms 
in the structural equation (probit) and the reduced-form equation for 
the endogenous variable (i.e., the share of outside directors) are not 
significantly correlated, suggesting that the endogeneity bias in the 
baseline estimation is not significant. 
TABLE 5
(CONTINUED)
adopted them. To deal with such potential endogeneity, we estimate the 
likelihood of adopting antitakeover provisions in year 2006 and there- 
after by conducting instrumental variable probit estimation using the 
share of outside directors as of year 2004 as instruments. Table 5 shows 
the estimation results. A Wald test of exogeneity shows that the error 
terms in the structural equation (probit) and the reduced-form equation 
for the endogenous variable (i.e., the share of outside directors) are in- 
significantly correlated, suggesting that the endogeneity bias in the base- 
line estimation is insignificant. The coefficients on the share of outside 
directors are insignificant, as in the baseline results. 
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C. Free Cash Flow Hypothesis
The free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen 1986) posits that firms with 
more liquid assets but with less growth opportunities tend to be targets 
of hostile takeovers. Xu (2007) supports this hypothesis using Japanese 
firm data. These firms may be more likely to adopt antitakeover provi- 
sions. To test this hypothesis, we use a dummy variable, which takes 
unity if Tobin’s Q is below its median for each year (i.e., 1.075, 1.203, 
1.204, and 1.105 in years 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively) 
and zero otherwise, and use as an explanatory variable the intersection 
of this dummy and the liquid asset ratio. To save space, we omit the 
table of this result.12 Nevertheless, this intersection term does not take 
significant coefficients in any year.
D. Firm Value Protection Hypothesis
Firms may adopt antitakeover provisions to protect the firm value 
from hostile takeovers that destroy the firm value either by breaching 
the long-run implicit contract between managers and workers or by 
redirecting the firm operation towards maximizing short-run cash flow. 
To explore this hypothesis, we assume two alternative specifications.
First, according to the breach of trust hypothesis, firms are more 
likely to adopt antitakeover provisions when their operating performances 
temporarily deteriorate. This move will cause a downward bias in the 
operating performance measures. We deal with this potential bias by 
using operating performance measures averaged over three years up to 
the previous year. Although we omit the table,13 most of the coefficients 
are similar to the baseline results except firm age, which turns out to 
be insignificant.
Next, we investigate whether firms tend to adopt antitakeover pro- 
visions when they are rich in long-run investment opportunities. As a 
measure of long-run investment, we use research and development ex- 
penditures as a proportion of sales; it is referred to as “R&D intensity” 
hereinafter. Firms may adopt antitakeover provisions to protect them- 
selves from the curtailment of R&D intensity based on a short-run 
viewpoint or from the transfer of intelligent assets to other firms 
12 The results, including the intersection term of the Q dummy and the liquid 
asset ratio, are available from the authors upon request.
13 The results using the three-year average operating performance measures 
are available from the authors upon request.
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　Explanatory variable











R&D intensity (R&D 
expenditure as a 
proportion of total assets)
-0.386 -0.009 -0.35 -1.934 -0.101 -1.06
ROA -0.622 -0.014 -0.74 0.523 0.027 0.7
Liquid asset ratio 0.856 0.020 1.57 -0.263 -0.014 -0.69
Firm age 0.000 0.000 -0.1 0.004 0.000 * 1.84
CEO's tenure -0.024 -0.001 * -1.85 -0.002 0.000 -0.32
Proportion of outside 
directors
0.146 0.003 0.28 0.422 0.022 1.22
Share of managerial 
ownership
-0.919 -0.021 -1.01 -3.155 -0.164 *** -3.64
Share of cross-holdings -0.242 -0.006 -0.27 1.675 0.087 *** 2.77
Logarithm of market-value 
equity
0.110 0.003 ** 2 0.092 0.005 * 1.9
Share of dominant 
shareholders
-1.774 0.000 *** -2.88 -1.884 -0.001 *** -4.79
Share of institutional 
investors
0.043 0.001 0.07 1.133 0.059 *** 3.2
Share of minority 
shareholders
-0.108 -0.002 -0.16 0.203 0.011 0.45
Debt-to-asset ratio -0.025 -0.001 -0.06 -0.849 -0.044 *** -2.87
Proportion of the firms 
that adopted antitakeover 
provisions in the industry
　 6.616 1.58


























FIRM VALUE PROTECTION HYPOTHESIS: PROBIT MODEL
through scorched earth strategies. The data source for R&D intensity is 
a database published by the Development Bank of Japan. The sample 
size is slightly smaller than the size in the baseline estimation (i.e., 
2784, 3037, 2727, and 2607 in years 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008, 
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Explanatory variable











R&D intensity (R&D 
expenditure as a 
proportion of total assets)
-0.062 -0.007 -0.13 -0.110 -0.005 -0.11
ROA 0.784 0.084 1.18 0.777 0.037 1.33
Liquid asset ratio 0.056 0.006 0.18 0.037 0.002 0.09
Firm age 0.001 0.000 0.58 0.004 0.000 * 1.7
CEO's tenure 0.007 0.001 1.37 0.002 0.000 0.32
Proportion of outside 
directors
0.000 0.000 0 -0.845 -0.040 * -1.85
Share of managerial 
ownership
-2.058 -0.221 *** -3.91 -1.655 -0.079 ** -2.35
Share of cross-holdings 1.256 0.135 ** 2.39 1.215 0.058 * 1.91
Logarithm of market-value 
equity
0.068 0.007 * 1.85 0.074 0.004 * 1.67
Share of dominant 
shareholders
-2.236 -0.240 *** -6.65 -2.604 -0.125 *** -5.35
Share of institutional 
investors
0.226 0.024 0.61 0.018 0.001 0.04
Share of minority 
shareholders
-0.296 -0.032 -0.73 -0.412 -0.020 -0.83
Debt-to-asset ratio -0.177 -0.019 -0.73 0.242 0.012 0.77
Proportion of the firms 
that adopted antitakeover 
provisions in the industry
2.143 0.230 * 1.87 3.312 0.159 *** 3.96
























Notes: We estimate the probit model in which the dependent variable takes 
the value of unity if the firm adopted antitakeover provisions and zero 




respectively). Table 6 shows the results. The coefficients for R&D inten- 
sities are negative and insignificant, which does not support the short- 
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Random effects probit model
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Notes: We estimate a random effects probit model. The dependent variable 
is a dummy that takes unity if the firm adopted antitakeover provi- 
sions in the given year or before and zero otherwise. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
TABLE 7
PANEL ESTIMATION
termism hypothesis. Most of the other variables are similar to the base- 
line estimation results. We also use R&D expenditures as a proportion 
of total assets and obtain insignificant coefficients for them.
E. Panel Estimation
As a final robustness check, we pool the data from year 2005 to year 
2008 and apply a panel data estimation method. If a firm’s decision on 
adopting antitakeover provisions is hit by idiosyncratic shocks that do 
not change over time, a random-effect probit model is the appropriate 
model. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes unity if the firm 
adopted antitakeover provisions in the year or before, and zero other- 
wise. The explanatory variables are lagged one year as in the baseline 
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS326
model. The proportion of firms adopting antitakeover provisions in the 
industry of the firm is excluded from the explanatory variables because 
its value is unavailable as of year 2005. We add year dummies to the 
explanatory variables.
Table 7 shows the estimation results. The specification test favors the 
random-effect probit model against the pooled probit model. The results 
are similar to the baseline results, and the performance measures are 
insignificant. Among the entrenchment measures, firm age, share of 
managerial ownership, and share of cross-shareholdings are significant 
with the expected signs. Among the control variables, the logarithm of 
market value, the share of dominant shareholders, and the debt-to-asset 
ratio are significant, with the same signs as in the benchmark year-by- 
year estimation results. 
VII. Conclusions 
We tested the managerial entrenchment hypothesis as a motive for 
adopting antitakeover provisions using Japanese firm data over the period 
of April 2005 to March 2009. Specifically, we tested whether a firm’s 
operating performance measures and the entrenchment measures are 
related to the likelihood of adopting antitakeover provisions. Our results 
are summarized as follows:
(1) Firm performance, as measured by ROA, Tobin’s Q, and PBR, is 
not correlated with the likelihood of adopting antitakeover provisions.
(2) Managerial entrenchment, as measured by older firm age, lower 
share of managerial ownership, and higher share of cross-shareholdings, 
is significantly correlated with the likelihood of adopting antitakeover 
provisions.
(3) Market liquidity, as measured by a lower share of ownership by 
dominant shareholders and a higher share of ownership by institutional 
investors, is significantly correlated with the likelihood of adopting anti- 
takeover provisions. The liquid asset ratio, debt-to-asset ratio, and pro- 
portion of firms adopting antitakeover provisions in the industry are also 
significantly correlated with the likelihood of adopting antitakeover 
provisions.
In sum, although firms do not tend to adopt antitakeover provisions 
in response to the deterioration of operating performance, they are more 
likely to do so when managerial entrenchment is more solidified. The 
positive correlation between the share of cross-shareholdings and the 
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likelihood of adopting antitakeover provisions, in particular, strongly 
suggests the entrenchment motive because firms with a higher share of 
cross-shareholdings are less likely to be targets of hostile takeover and 
yet are more likely to adopt antitakeover provisions.
We plan to investigate the effects of antitakeover provisions on long- 
term performance, either in terms of market-based or operating perform- 
ance, as post-adoption data will accumulate over time. 
(Received 9 November 2010; 12 January 2011; Accepted 19 January 
2011)
Appendix: Definitions of Variables
A. Variables Measuring Performance
ROA: Current profits as a proportion of total assets as of the previous 
accounting year.
Tobin’s Q: The sum of market-valued stocks and book-valued debt as a 
proportion of total assets, including unrealized profits (or losses) of 
subsidiaries and affiliates.
PBR: Market-valued stocks as a proportion of book-valued shareholders’ 
equity.
Liquid asset ratio: The sum of cash and deposits, securities, and secur- 
ities for investment as a proportion of total assets. We delete firms 
with negative liquid assets from the sample.
B. Variables Measuring Entrenchment
Firm age: The difference between the current year and the year when 
the firm was established. The latter is available in Quarterly Company 
Report (Kaisha Shiki Ho) published by Toyo Keizai Shimpo Sha.
CEO’s tenure: The difference between the current year and the year 
when the current CEO took his/her position. 
Share of outside directors: The number of outside directors as a propor- 
tion of the total number of directors.
Share of managerial ownership: Share of stocks held by managers. Firms 
that are estimated to be more than 100 percent held by managers 
are excluded from the sample.
Share of cross-holdings: Share of stocks held by listed companies whose 
shares are held by the firm, as estimated by Nissei Life Insurance 
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(NLI) Research Institute. 
C. Control Variables
Logarithm of market-valued equity: Natural logarithm of market-valued 
equity.
Share of ownership by dominant shareholders: Share of controlling firms 
that own more than a 15 percent share of the firm. 
Share of ownership by institutional investors: Shares of ownership by 
foreigners excluding foreign corporations, trust accounts, and special 
accounts of life insurance companies.
Share of minority shareholders: Share of ownership by individuals and 
firms that own fewer than 50 trading units.
Debt-to-asset ratio: Total debt as a proportion of total assets.
The proportion of firms that adopted antitakeover provisions in the in- 
dustry of the firm: Available only for accounting year 2005 and there- 
after.
R&D intensity: Expenditures on research and development as a propor- 
tion of sales. The data source is the Financial Statement Data Bank 
published by the Development Bank of Japan.
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